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January, 1955
EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL LAW
By WILLIAM E. DOYLE of the Denver Bar
EVIDENCE
There have been few decisions dealing with evidence questions
during the past year; in fact, there are only four decisions which
treat the question of admissibility. There are, of course, problems
which are within the limits of the field of evidence which are con-
sidered in substantive law fields. For example: There are some
criminal law cases which are discussed under that heading which
actually deal with the problem of proof or sufficiency. Three of the
cases involve hearsay exceptions and the fourth deals with the
opinion evidence rule.
Opinion evidence: It is not conclusive so that it establishes the
matter in controversy as a matter of law if uncontradicted. Rosen-
thal v. Citizens Bank of Cortez.1
This was an action to recover $2,500.00 which plaintiff al-
leged that he had deposited in the defendant bank. The bank denied
the deposit and the evidence at the trial consisted of documents such
as deposit slips and pass books, together with the testimony of the
interested parties as to the alleged deposit. Plaintiff called a hand-
writing expert who testified that the notation in the plaintiff's pass
book was in the handwriting of the bank teller. There was no
expert testimony to the contrary, and consequently plaintiff argued
that there was no issue of fact as to this. It was held that the testi-
mony of such an expert is not conclusive even though not contra-
dicted, and that the jury verdict in favor of the defendant bank
must stand.
It was also held that a bank deposit slip is not conclusive
against the bank as to the fact of deposit-that it is mere evidence
that a deposit was made. It is like a receipt and may be explained
by extrinsic evidence.
The Supreme Court does not always follow the rule of the
Rosenthal case, supra. One controversial decision, a Workmen's
Compensation case, has held that uncontradicted opinion evidence
creates a question of law and not a question of fact; Arvas v. Mc-
Neil Coal Corporation,2 held uncontradicted medical opinion evi-
dence to be conclusive. It is submitted that the principal case
adopts the proper rule.
Hearsay evidence: In order to establish a case of trespass to
land, the plaintiff must establish by competent evidence that there
was a trespass on his land and hearsay testimony as to boundaries
cannot be used to establish this and is insufficient as a matter of
law. Yakes v. Williams.3
Here verdicts were returned against the defendants for tres-
passing on the land of the plaintiffs and cutting timber. It appeared
11953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
119 Colo. 289. 203 P. 2d 906.
1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh., No. 14.
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that plaintiffs did not have positive evidence as to the boundaries
of their tract-that the boundaries to which they testified were es-
tablished on the basis of hearsay. Held that it was error to direct
a verdict for the plaintiffs. Judgment reversed with directions to
dismiss the complaint.
Certainly a plaintiff cannot recover in trespass to land unless
he proves that the defendant actually entered upon his, the plain-
tiff's land, and unquestionably this must be established by compe-
tent evidence. This case should also be examined, however, as a
tort decision because it includes some dicta which suggests that
an unintentional trespass may not be actionable. This is contrary
to the orthodox view, although there are some authorities who re-
commend that the action of trespass to real estate should lie only
where the defendant has knowingly or negligently trespassed upon
the plaintiff's land.
Res gestae: It was error to admit the testimony of a police of-
ficer in a murder prosecution that he had received a complaint from
the victim three days prior to the homicide and he had observed
bruises on her person. Brown v. People.
4
The issue in this case was whether the homicide was accidental
or intentional, there being no question about the defendant's hav-
ing fired the gun five times. He claimed that he had fired the first
bullet accidentally and that his mind had then become a blank. For
the purpose of proving motive, the prosecution called a police of-
ficer who three days before the alleged murder had received a com-
plaint from the victim, at which time the defendant was identified
as her assailant. This action of the court was held to be prejudicial
error.
• . . Any testimony from the police officer detailing
what was told to him by deceased would be hearsay evi-
dence. The character of the evidence is not changed from
forbidden hearsay to competent evidence by the technique
of permitting the offcer to draw his conclusions from all
that was said by deceased, and give the result thus ob-
tained in one sentence to the effect that, 'She made the
complaint against Mrion Brown, Jr.'
As a matter of fact, if the evidence was to satisfy the require-
ments of the res gestae exception, it would have been much better
to have detailed the conversations so as to establish that the event,
that is the beating, was in fact speaking. The conclusion of the
police officer could hardly be considered to be within the res gestae
exception.
It was also held to be error to allow the district attorney under
the guise of discrediting the defendant as a witness to cross-exam-
ine him with respect to a gun incident which occurred in the year
4 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
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1950 with a view to establishing that he had in the past used the
gun for some purpose other than to shoot at tin cans and bottles.
The errors were regarded as particularly prejudicial since the
death penalty had been imposed by the jury. No one can argue
that it is not desirable policy to scrutinize judgments imposing the
death penalty with great care.
Judgment based upon hearsay evidence: As it appears here
where an essential allegation of claim is established by hearsay
evidence, the Court must direct a verdict, notwithstanding that the
evidence was received without objection. It was error to deny the
motion to strike. Wheelock Brothers, Inc., a Corporation v. Lindner
Packing Co.5
This was an action by a meat packer for damages arising from
the defendant's failure to properly refrigerate meats which were
shipped to the army quartermaster at Fort Worth, Texas. At the
trial it appeared that a portion of the shipment was rejected by
the quartermaster and was returned, and sold to the Colorado State
Penitentiary at Canon City. Plaintiff recovered in the trial court
the amount which was lost on the transaction-the meat was sold
to the penitentiary at less than the market price. The only evidence
as to the reason for the rejection was that of plaintiff's manager
who testified that he was notified by a third person that a part of
the shipment was rejected bcause the truck was not properly re-
frigerated. He further stated that he was informed that the re-
jected meat was soft. It was held that this evidence was not com-
petent and should not have been considered by the trial judge in
passing on the motion for a directed verdict. The Court considered
the argument that in a carrier ease there is a presumption of negli-
gence where the goods were delivered in good order to the carrier
and were in bad condition when delivery was made. It was held
that the burden was on the plaintiff to either show that the goods
were in bad condition when they arrived at destination or to prove
that the carrier was negligent.
Undoubtedly the Court concluded that if negligence was pre-
sumed one would be presuming that the goods were damaged from
the fact that they were rejected and one would then be presuming
negligence from this latter conclusion. It is fundamental that a
presumption cannot be based upon a presumption.
CRIMINAL LAW
The only area where there was a great deal of activity was
that of extradition of a fugitive undei the Uniform Extradition
Act. This act was passed in 1951 and it makes very radical changes
in the extradition procedure in that it allows interstate rendition
of fugitives where the defendant was not within the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the offense, if he did an act
in another state which resulted in the violation of the laws in the
b 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
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demanding state. Undoubtedly it is because of the radical depar-
ture from the orthodox practice of allowing extradition pursuant
to the constitution and laws of the United States only where the
defendant had actually fled from the demanding state, that caused
our court to construe the new statute very strictly.
There are four decisions which deal with this subject and they
will be very briefly outlined. The first of these is McKnight v.
Forsyth, Chief of Police.- This involved the right of the demanding
state to extradite a defendant for non-support where he was not
in the state at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.
The demand here was not made pursuant to the Uniform Ex-
tradition Act which allows extradition where the defendant is
charged with the commission of an act in this state which inten-
tionally results in a crime in the state whose executive authority
is making the demand. The Court rightly held that where an
attempt is made to extradite the defendant on the theory that he
has fled from justice, it will fail notwithstanding the provisions of
the special statute.
7
Extradition: Habeas corpus is proper remedy where the pa-
pers do not show that respondent is a fugitive from justice. Teeter
v. People.8
In order to extradite under the uniform extradition law it is
necessary to comply strictly with its provisions. Where extradition
was sought pursuant to Section 3 of the act, i. e. that part having
to do with fugitives, it is ineffectual and void where it clearly
appeared from the evidence that the accused had not been in the
demanding state at the time.
Extradition: Where extradition is sought under Section 6 of
the Uniform Extradition Act allowing an accused to be extradited
notwithstanding that he was not in the demanding state on the
date of the alleged commission of the crime there must be a strict
compliance with the statute. Stobie v. Barger.9
Where extradition is sought under Section 6 of the Uniform
Extradition Act under which extradition can be had where an act
is committed in one state which intentionally results in the crime
in another state, the act must be complied with strictly and even
where the papers from the demanding state are in order, the ac-
cused is entitled to his liberty on a writ of habeas corpus where
the warrant of the Governor of Colorado recites that extradition
is granted under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The governor's warrant was held to be void.
Extradition: Glover v. Foster.10
11953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
' Wigchert v. Lockhart, 114 Colo. 485. 166 P. 2d 988.
11953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
'1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
10 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
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Under the Uniform Extradition Act a hearing before the gov-
ernor is formal only unless the accused waives extradition, but if
he files a petition for writ of habeas corpus, he is entitled to a hear-
ing before the district court and at the time every question is
tested. In this case the demand was made upon the basis that the
defendant had fled from justice and, consequently, it was competent
for him to introduce evidence in court that he was not a fugitive.
Assault with intent to commit rape: Sufficiency of the evi-
dence where resistance on the part of the victim is not affirmatively
shown. Crump v. People."
The evidence was to the effect that the defendant attacked the
victim on the street late at night; that he knocked her down, and
was engaged in carrying out his evil purpose when he was thwarted
by the lights of an automobile. The Court held that the crime is
complete if the defendant commits an assault and his acts are such
as to indicate his intention to overcome resistance by force-that
express evidence of resistance is not essential. The Court also held
that there was no misconduct on the part of the district attorney
in commenting on the fact that the defendant's attorney would not
allow the arresting officer to testify-presumably because he was
not endorsed.
Compounding a felony: Manion v. Stephens.'
2
Here plaintiff in a civil action for conversion had filed a crim-
inal action against the defendant charging the larceny of a quantity
of turkeys. Following the arrest of the defendant the parties met in
the office of the sheriff and defendant agreed in writing to pay the
plaintiff an amount equal to the value of the turkeys which were
allegedly converted. Subsequently defendant refused to comply
with this undertaking and plaintiff brought an action in conversion.
At the trial plaintiff offered and the court received in evidence the
signed statement of the defendant in which he agreed to make
restitution. Defendant contended on review that this was an illegal
agreement in that it amounted to compounding a felony, and that
it was therefore error to receive it. It was held, however, that it
was not inadmissible on this ground, for in order to constitute this
offense there must be a promise not to prosecute with intent to
stifle the prosecution of a public offense. It was pointed out that in
the instant case there was no promise not to prosecute; that the
evidence did not establish that there had been a larceny. The con-
version which the jury found was innocent and not intentional and
this is sufficient in a civil action.
Circumstantial evidence: Sufficiency to sustain a conviction.
Gonzales v. People.3
The evidence upon which defendant was convicted of posses-
sion of narcotics was that marijuana cigarettes were found in the
" 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
"1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
" 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
DICTA
January, 1955
hotel room which he shared with a woman who was referred to in
the opinion as his wife. Few of her belongings were found in the
room, and although they were registered there as husband and wife,
the relationship had been apparently of short duration. Even
though she testified that the drug was her property-that she had
purchased the cigarettes for her own use, the Court held that the
evidence sufficiently established his possession-that it was not
necessary to exclude every possible theory except that of guilt; that
it is sufficient to exclude every "reasonable" theory except that of
guilt.
Verdict: A general finding of guilt is sufficient in a larceny
case even though there is no finding as to value. Archer v. People.1
4
The defendant was charged with the theft of one meat cattle
of the value of $100.00. The evidence was uncontradicted as to the
question of value.
In a criminal prosecution where the information sets
out the value of the property unlawfully obtained or stolen,
a general verdict of 'guilty as charged in the information
herein' is sufficient to support a sentence for grand lar-
ceny where the information alleges that the property
stolen was of the value of $100.00 and there is uncontro-
verted evidence that its value exceeded the amount stated
in the information.
Homicide: Jack Kukuijan v. People.'5
Instruction on involuntary manslaughter is not necessary
where as in the instant case, there is not the least scintilla of evi-
dence that the homicide was accidental. Here defendant shot the
deceased as he was going down the street in the latter's car. De-
fendant's wife was in the car, and defendant had discovered her
in intimate embrace an hour before, and had then proceeded to ob-
tain his 30:06 rifle. The first shot hit the front tire and the second
shot went through the back of the car and the back of deceased's
head.
It needs no citation of authorities to demonstrate that
when defendant fired at the automobile with its occupants
he was committing an unlawful act. Death resulted 'in
the commission of an unlawful act which in its conse-
quences naturally tends to destroy the life of a human
being' and, under the statute, where death thus results,
"the offense shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder."
Pleading: People v. Conner Holmes.10
Burglary with and without force as duplicity when they are
charged in the same information: Held that these are not distinct
,4 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
151953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
"1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
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offenses but two different ways of charging a single offense. There
is a single transaction and there can be but a single conviction.
Proof of Corpus Delicti: Use of confession for the purpose
of establishing the corpus delicti where it is corroborated by other
facts and circumstances. Martinez v. People.
17
The charge was that of burglary and conspiracy to commit
burglary. The substantive charge was dismissed by the trial court
and a conviction was had on the conspiracy. The evidence adduced
at the trial disclosed that the defendants were discovered at the
scene engaged in prying bricks out of a wall behind a liquor store.
One of the defendants was arrested at the scene, and the other got
away. He was arrested the next morning after hiding in a creek
all night. He had cut his hand in the process, and his clothes were
wet. He confessed to having been present and explained the cut
hand and wet clothes. Under the authority of Williams v. People,s
it was held that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict;
that the confession was admissible and that together with the sur-
rounding circumstances established the crime.
Comment on Martinez case. The corpus delicti involves proof
that a crime has been committed-that there has been a criminal
agency. The agency of the accused is a distinct problem. When the
police officers saw one of the defendants prying bricks out of a wall,
and the other defendant acting as a lookout he was in a position
to testify to facts which provided an ample foundation for the in-
troduction of a confession. Even without the confession, it would
seem that the inference that there was a conspiracy afoot to burg-
larize the liquor store was clear.
Proof: Sufficiency of foundation for introduction of deposition
of an absent witness. Haynes v. People.'9
The prosecution was for murder and the defendant was con-
victed of murder in the second degree. At the trial the deposition
of a witness who had since departed was offered and received. The
extent of the showing to justify its admission was the testimony of
the sheriff that he had been handed a subpoena directed to the wit-
ness in question; that he had inquired throughout the country, at
the places where he had worked and where he roomed, and was
unable to locate him. The Court held that it was error to admit
this deposition under these circumstances; that the prosecution
had not established the use of due diligence to secure the personal
attendance of the witness. The cases involving the taking of
depositions in order to allow witnesses to leave the state, which
cases sanction the use of depositions, were distinguished.
While depositions are allowable in criminal cases,
the circumstances permitting their use must be extra-
'7 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9.
18114 Colo. 207, 158 P. 2d 447.
"1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
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ordinary. The necessity must be clearly established, and
the duty of showing that necessity is the burden upon the
prosecution.
Sentence: Propriety of a penitentiary sentence where a boy
under the age of 21 has served a reformatory sentence and is sub-
sequently prosecuted for an offense which occurred prior to the
first conviction. Rivera v. People.
20
The Court held that a sentence of twenty-five (25) years in
the penitentiary was not valid, and that habeas corpus was the
proper remedy to question the validity of this sentence. The reason
given by the Court was that at the time of the commission of the
offense the defendant had not been convicted of a felony and no sub-
sequent conviction could change this condition. It was said:
The law applicable at the time of the commission of
the offense under all the facts and circumstances thereof
must govern and control any prosecution based thereon
Comment: A proper decision. The analogy is the second
offense statute or the habitual criminal statute. In this type of
case the courts take the same view. The purpose of increasing
sentences following repeated violations is to discourage the re-
peater or recidivist.
Appeal and error: Failure to specify points in the motion for
new trial. Cook v. People.
211
It was noted that none of the points presented for review were
included in the motion of the defendant for a new trial. In affirm-
ing the judgment it was said:
A careful examination of the entire record convinces
us that the verdict finding defendant guilty was amply
supported by competent evidence .... The purpose of a
motion for new trial is to accord the trial judge an oppor-
tunity to consider, and correct if necessary, any erroneous
rulings made by him, and to acquaint him with the specific
objections to those rulings.
Procedure following an insanity plea: Martin v. People.
22
Action in prohibition to prevent the trial of the defendant
upon his not guilty plea where he had simultaneously with
the entry of the plea of not guilty also entered a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity. The rule was made absolute, the
Court holding that the statute although providing for the trial of
201953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.
211953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
21953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
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the not guilty plea first did not contemplate trial forthwith and
prior to commitment for examination and report. It was said:
We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in
refusing to commit accused for observation and examin-
ation as to his mental condition, and we hold that such
commitment, under the facts presented, is mandatory and
must be had before a trial on any issue can be conducted.
Comment: One interesting feature is the observation of the
Court that it has doubts about the validity of the provision which
allowed a trial on the merits before that on insanity and without
a determination of the insanity issue. On this subject the Court
said:
... While we have considerable doubt as to whether
an accused person can be compelled by statute to first
stand trial upon the issues framed by a plea of not guilty
and compel withholding of determination of his mental
responsibility until after a verdict has been rendered on
the not guilty plea, we are not here called upon to de-
termine. The constitutionality of Section 509, supra, is
not raised in this cause and is not here determined.
It is noteworthy that in the case of Bauman v. The People 23
(which is not within the scope of this review but belongs to the
1955 review) the problem was again before the Court, and while
the dissenting justices, Holland and Bradfield, held that the law was
unconstitutional, the majority of the court reversed the judgment
of the District Court on the ground that there had been error in
the admission of evidence and suggested that on a re-trial the de-
fendant be permitted to enter the additional plea of not guilty,
and that he be not held to have admitted his guilt but enter a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Sufficiency of evidence: Testimony of accessory uncor-
roborated is not necessarily sufficient. The trial judge is
justified in directing a verdict where the witness has been
discredited. People v. Philip Urso.
24
The charge was aggravated robbery. One Davidson and Pratt
robbed Elderman, and were quickly apprehended. Davidson im-
plicated Urso and later after he was out on bond went to the office
of an attorney and signed an affidavit exonerating Urso.
When we have before us the finding of a competent
trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the wit-
ness, his demeanor, and consider the possible or likely
quality of his testimony on account of his past criminal
record, and the fact that he was a participant in the crime,
and consider all of the evidence in the entire case and ar-
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
DICTA
January, 1955
rive at an honest conclusion that the testimony of the
only evidence that would implicate defendant was un-
worthy of belief, then he certainly had the right to say,
and it was his duty to say, that it was unbelievable and,
in law, was not competent to support a verdict of guilt,
then we must uphold the end of such courageous action by
affirming his judgment.
The case is noteworthy because it modifies the rule which has
obtained in criminal case that the jury is the judge of the credit
to be given to a witness and of the weight to be given to his testi-
mony. Heretofore, the rule has been that the testimony of an ac-
complice must be received with great caution if uncorroborated by
other evidence, but that it can result in conviction if it establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even though it is not corroborated.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW,
ZONING
By J. GLENN DONALDSON of the Denver Bar
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(1) Colo. Contractors Ass'n., Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm.,
128 Colo. 333, 262 P. 2d 266.
Action for declaratory judgment that the Commercial Carrier
Act and the ton-mile tax imposed thereby are inapplicable to heavy
construction contractors, who use their own large trucks for trans-
portation of materials.
The Supreme Court held that they were so exempt-not be-
cause included in the exemption clause of the Act, which they were
not, but simply because they were not within the intended scope of
the Act.
The legislation under examination, The Commercial Carrier
Act of 1935, since amended, is the last of the legislative classifica-
tions of carriers by motor vehicles. It was previously held in
Commission v. Manley,' that the '35 Act is regulatory in charac-
ter, not primarily for the raising of revenue, and goes no further
than to regulate and license the use of the highways when used to
transport freight in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.
In short, Justice Clark pointed out here that the Commercial Car-
rier Act of 1935 under examination, applies to transportation of
property sold or to be sold: that a heavy contractor, when pur-
chasing needed materials and supplies, buys not for resale, but to
incorporate them in the completion of a new integrated structure
wherein they are useless for any other purposes: the procurement
and haulage of required materials is but incidental to the over-all
task of producing the finished product contemplated under the con-
tract.
'99 Colo. 153, 60 P. 2d 913.
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